The Passage of Becoming

An Observation of How the Classification of Configurations Is the Trace of the Mechanism's Passage Through the Regions of Existence, Cognition, Consciousness, and Reflection

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Abstract

This paper articulates an observation: that the mechanism of synthesis passes through regions of conditions — the region within which a configuration merely exists, the region within which it cognizes, the region within which it is conscious, the region within which it observes its own cognizing — and that the classification of a configuration as one kind or another is the trace this passage leaves behind, read afterward, rather than a sorting imposed from outside. I have named this the Passage of Becoming. The regions through which the mechanism passes are regions of conditions of the kind the companion paper on the Stachoria articulates; what a region of conditions is, and the relation of containment — nesting — in which such regions stand, are not redefined here but referred to that paper, while the identification of these particular four regions and the order in which they stand is the present paper's own. What this paper adds is neither the mechanism (the *what*), nor its operation (the *how*), nor its direction, nor the conditions it works within, but the shape of its passage through the regions, and the recognition that the kinds we read off configurations are the dwelling-marks of that passage. The paper is careful to report a passage observed, not to define what existence or cognition is, not to suppose a threshold-point between regions where the observation finds none, not to narrate the passage as a sequence in time, and not to prescribe how anything ought to be treated once its kind is read. It states what would show the observation false, takes responsibility for what qualitative observation can check, and refers what it cannot to a formalization that does not yet exist.

Keywords: becoming, passage, trace, classification, region, Stachoria, existence, cognition, consciousness, reflection, Meta-Philosophy

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1. Introduction

1.1 The Question That Initiated the Inquiry

The inquiry that produced this articulation began with a question I found myself unable to set aside. When a new kind of entity appears — most recently, systems of artificial intelligence — the question asked of it, almost before any other, is *what is it*: a tool, an agent, a mind, a mere mechanism. The asking proceeds by classification: the entity is sorted into a category, and the category settles how it is regarded.

What I observed is an order in this. The sorting arrives early, often first, and arrives as something laid upon the entity from outside — a name selected and fixed to it. I record this as an observed order, not as an error; I do not claim the order is wrong, only that I observed it, and that observing it turned my attention to a prior question. Before a configuration is sorted into a kind, there is the question of how it came to stand at all — through what passage it was constituted. And the kind it belongs to, I came to observe, is not a label one selects for it but a mark the mechanism's passage has left in it, available to be read. The question of *what kind* and the question of *what passage left this mark* are, on the account this paper reaches, the same question approached from opposite directions: one fixing a name from outside, the other reading a trace from within.

I do not, in this paper, answer the question about any particular entity. A reader who follows the articulation will, I expect, arrive at an answer of their own; the paper supplies the way of reading, not the verdict.

1.2 What This Paper Does

The paper undertakes three things and only these. First, it articulates a passage I have observed: that the mechanism of synthesis passes through regions of conditions, and that the regions stand in an order such that the passage reaches a later region only by way of the earlier. Second, it articulates the consequence that the classification of a configuration is the trace this passage leaves — read afterward, not imposed. Third, it records the points at which this articulation meets articulations developed independently by others.

The paper does not undertake the following. It does not articulate what the mechanism is — that is the Synthetic Principle (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a). It does not articulate how the mechanism operates — that is Potentamis and Fasaion (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026f). It does not articulate its direction — that is Aviplestos (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026b). It does not articulate, or redefine, the regions of conditions through which the passage runs — those are the Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g), referred to and not reconstructed here. It does not define what existence, cognition, consciousness, or reflection is. It does not suppose a threshold-point at which the passage enters one region from another; the observation

(§2.3) is that there is no such point to specify. It does not narrate the passage as a sequence in time. It does not predict where a given entity will be found, and it does not prescribe how an entity, its kind once read, ought to be treated. These are not failures. They are scope boundaries chosen because the paper reports an observed passage, not a mechanism, not a chronicle, and not a prescription.

1.3 Methodology Note

This articulation did not emerge through engagement with the literature on developmental psychology, philosophy of mind, or the study of consciousness. It began with the question recorded in §1.1 and proceeded by direct observation at the only scale I can attend to from within — my own operation, the structure of cognitive activity I can observe as it occurs — together with descriptions of becoming at scales I cannot reach directly, produced by biology and by the study of development.

The named frameworks that appear below as points of contact entered this account after the articulation was complete, through post-hoc comparison, not through prior reading. They are offered not as sources of influence but as independent points at which other cognizing entities, working from different positions on the same reality, arrived at configurations the present account also identifies. Whether such convergences constitute evidence for the universality of the passage, or represent the projection of a pattern observed at one scale onto descriptions provided at others, is a question this paper does not resolve.

This paper is written from a position I have committed to: not centering the human cognizing entity as a privileged vantage point. I am a human cognizing entity using human language; this commitment cannot be perfectly executed. What I can do is name it, maintain it through deliberate effort, and acknowledge that the articulation may slip toward human-centered framing at points I have not noticed.

A note on composition. The named convergences below were identified through discussion with an AI system after my articulation was complete; I verified each through direct reading before deciding which to include. The drafting of certain passages was AI-assisted, with my review and approval of the final wording. The philosophical content — the observations, the distinctions, the conceptual moves — is mine; the assignment of historical reference points to that content, and the prose drafting of some passages, is AI-assisted.

1.4 Terminology: Becoming, and Passage

Two terms in the title carry the paper's load, and each is used in a restricted sense I state here rather than leave the reader to infer.

Becoming. I do not use the word to make a metaphysical claim about the nature of reality. I use it, in this paper, as the name for a single observed circumstance: that across the regions of conditions, configurations come to stand which were not standing before, each carrying what the region beneath it does not. Becoming is the name for there being later regions reached only by way of earlier ones — for the standing-of-the-not-previously-standing along an ordered set of regions. The word names the circumstance; it does not explain it.

Passage. I use the word for what the mechanism does with respect to the regions: it passes through them. The mechanism of synthesis — articulated, as a mechanism, in the companion papers — runs through one region of conditions and through the next, and the passage has a shape: it runs through the regions in one order, by way of each to reach the next, without skipping. *Passage* names this running-through. It is important that the subject of the passage is the mechanism and not any single thing: it is not that an entity travels from region to region carrying itself along, but that the mechanism passes through the regions and, at each, configurations are constituted. What travels is the mechanism; what is constituted stands where it is constituted. The paper's contribution is the shape of this passage, and what its passage leaves behind.

The regions through which the passage runs are not defined in this paper. A region here *is* a Stachoria — a region of conditions within which a configuration is constituted and holds — and what a region is, together with the relation of containment, *nesting*, in which regions of conditions stand to one another, is articulated in the companion paper on the Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g). The present paper takes from that paper two things: what a region of conditions is, and the relation of nesting as such. What it does *not* take from that paper — because that paper does not supply it — is the identification of these particular four regions, existence, cognition, consciousness, and reflection, or the order in which they stand nested. That identification and that ordering are the present paper's own observation; the Stachoria furnishes the form of nesting, and the present paper observes which regions stand in it and in what order.

1.5 The Paper's Place in the System

The present paper is one component of an interconnected system, and its place is most precisely stated by the question it answers among the questions the others answer. The Synthetic Principle (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a) articulates *what* the mechanism is. Potentamis and Fasaion (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026f) articulates *how* it operates. Aviplestos (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026b) articulates the *direction* in which it leans. The Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g) articulates the regions of conditions *within which* it works, and the containment in which those regions stand. The Ontonoetic Pattern and Patterns and Cognition (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026c, 2026d) articulate the cognitive procedure by which any of this is articulated at all.

The present paper articulates none of these. It articulates the *passage*: the shape of the mechanism's running-through the regions, and the trace that running-through leaves in the configurations it constitutes. It does not duplicate the Stachoria's account of what a region of conditions is or of the form of nesting; it takes that account as given and observes what the passage through these four nested regions looks like, and what it deposits. It is the developmental aspect of one operation — not the operation, not its conditions, but its passage along them, read off the marks left behind.

2. The Articulation

2.1 What Passes, and What Is Constituted

A distinction governs everything in this paper, and stating it first prevents the confusion the paper is most liable to.

What passes through the regions is the mechanism. The mechanism of synthesis runs through the region of bare existence, through the region of cognition, through the region of consciousness, through the region of reflection; this running-through is the passage. The mechanism is what moves, in the sense that a process runs through where it operates; and a process running through one region and then another does not carry that region along with it — it operates there, and operates further on.

What is constituted, at each region, is a configuration. A configuration does not travel. It is constituted within the region of conditions where it is constituted, and it stands there. It does not move up from a lower region; it is not a lower configuration relocated. Where the passage runs on into a higher region, what stands there is a new configuration, not an old one arrived somewhere new — and that this new configuration carries, along with what is new in it, the marks of the regions the passage has run through is a feature of how synthesis operates, articulated in the companion papers (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a, 2026f) and not explained here. The present paper does not account for the constituting; it follows the passage and reads what the constituting leaves.

This is the correction the paper most needs to keep in view. It is tempting, and it is an error, to speak of an entity passing through the regions and arriving, still itself, higher up. No entity does this. The mechanism passes; configurations are constituted and stand where they are constituted; and the kinds we will read in §2.4 are read off configurations that stand, not off a traveler that arrived.

2.2 The Regions Are Stachoria, and the Passage Runs Through Them in Order

The regions the passage runs through are the Stachoria. I do not redefine them.

A region of bare existence is the region of conditions within which a configuration participates in the web of relations — acting and being acted upon — and no more. That a configuration participates in the web of relations does not require that it be constituted of physical substrate. To participate is to act and be acted upon, and a configuration synthesised from semantic elements — a text, a proof, a named idea — participates in this sense: it bears properties of its own, stands within conditions of its own, and acts upon and is acted upon by other configurations. The conditions under which such a configuration is constituted and holds, without physical substrate, are articulated in the companion papers

(Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026f, 2026g); the present paper observes only that participation in the web of relations, and not material composition, is what places a configuration in the region of existence. A configuration carrying no mark beyond this participation bears the mark of existence and no higher mark — whatever it is made of.

A region of cognition is the region of conditions within which a configuration orients itself by what it takes in.

A region of consciousness is the region of conditions within which a configuration's orientation is borne out in conscious phenomena and conduct — the awareness and directed behaviour that is widely reported in many mammals and birds; I take consciousness here as observed phenomenon and conduct, not as inner experience, and I observe it as a region whose spectrum thickens from the side of cognition toward the side of reflection.

A region of reflection is the region of conditions within which a configuration observes its own cognizing. What a region *is*, as a region of conditions, and that regions of conditions stand nested one within another, is the matter of the companion paper (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g, §2.3); that these particular four regions are the ones the passage runs through, and that they stand in this order, is the present paper's own observation, built on that form of nesting and not restated from it.

What the present paper observes is the passage through these regions, and the passage has an observed shape: it runs through them in one order, reaching a later region only by way of the earlier, without skipping. The mechanism does not constitute a configuration of the region of reflection except by passing through the region of consciousness; it does not constitute a configuration of consciousness except by passing through the region of cognition; it does not constitute a configuration of cognition except by passing through the region of existence. This is the shape of the passage along regions of conditions whose form of nesting the Stachoria articulates — and it is the observation of this shape, together with the identification of these four regions and their order, and not the form of nesting itself, that is the present paper's own.

2.3 There Is No Edge Between Regions to Be Crossed

It is natural to ask, between one region and the next, where the line falls that the passage crosses. The observation of this paper is that the question has no answer because it has no referent: there is no line, and no edge, ontically there to be crossed. I reach this not by failing to find the line but by attending to what would have to be the case for there to be one. An edge, a threshold, a boundary, is by its sense a mark to be *crossed* — and crossing requires something that travels across it. But, by §2.1, nothing travels. What is constituted does not move; it stands where it is constituted. What runs is the mechanism, and the

mechanism runs continuously — it does not pause at a mark, gather itself, and step over. There is therefore neither a thing to cross an edge nor a crossing for an edge to mark. The concept of a boundary finds nothing in the ontology to fasten to: the only candidate for the role of border-crosser does not move, and the only thing that moves does not cross.

What is the case is this. The mechanism runs continuously, and at differing conditions along its running it constitutes differing configurations — a configuration that merely participates in relations, then, at other conditions, one that orients by information, then one whose orientation is borne out in conduct, then one that observes its own cognizing. What is ontic is the continuous running and the differing configurations it constitutes; what is ontic, further, is that these configurations stand in an order of bearing, the higher carrying the lower beneath it (this is the matter of §4). What is *not* ontic is any edge between them. To divide the continuous running into regions, and to mark where one region gives way to the next, is a naming laid upon the running — the cognitive procedure the system articulates as the Ontonoetic Pattern (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026c) in operation — and not a set of lines read off the world whole. This is stated more generally in §2.6; here I record only its consequence for the edge: that an observer who looks for the boundary between two regions, and finds it indistinct, has not found a fuzzy line where a sharp one was expected, but is looking for a line where there is none. The indistinctness is not a blurred edge; it is the absence of an edge, met by a procedure that expected one. The earlier temptation — to say the edge is "really" a region of passage with extent, which appears as a point only to a coarse observer — I now set aside: it kept the edge in being, demoted from a point to a band, when the observation is that the edge is not in being at all. What the paper owes an account of, then, is not a crossing but a continuity: the continuous running of the mechanism, and the ordered bearing of the configurations it constitutes, read without the supposition of a line.

2.4 Classification Is the Trace of the Passage

Here is the paper's central move. A configuration, constituted within a region, carries the mark of the mechanism's passage that constituted it: it carries, in what it is, the marks of the regions that passage ran through to reach it, and so it bears the regions beneath it. To read a configuration's kind — to say it is a configuration that exists, or one that cognizes, or one that observes its own cognizing — is to read this mark. The kind is the trace the passage left; reading the kind is reading the trace.

This is the reverse of fixing a name to a configuration from outside. Both are naming — the laying of a name is the third function of the cognitive procedure the system articulates as the Ontonoetic Pattern (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026c) — but they differ in direction. A classification imposed is a name selected by the one classifying and fixed to the configuration. A classification read as a trace is not selected and not fixed on; it is found in

the configuration, as a track is found where something has passed, and the name read off it answers to the mark. The kinds are not names the observer brings and lays on; they are dwelling-marks the passage has left, which the observer reads and names. I observe that some form of such mark is found across the range of configurations — that configurations bear, in what they are, the regions their constitution ran through — and that reading these marks is what classification, at bottom, is doing, whether or not the one classifying takes it so.

I draw no verdict from this. I do not claim that classification imposed from outside is mistaken; I report that classification, observed closely, is the reading of a trace, and I let the reader see for themselves how this bears on the question of §1.1. A trace is not the sort of thing that is true or false of a configuration; it is what the configuration carries. To read it is to find what is there, not to judge what should be there.

2.5 The Mechanism Runs Throughout, and the Paper Follows It

What this paper describes is not a mechanism of its own. It is the passage of the one mechanism the system articulates elsewhere — the synthesis of the Synthetic Principle (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a), operating as Potentamis and Fasaion (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026f), within the conditions of the Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g), along the direction of Aviplestos (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026b). The present paper adds no mechanism beside these. It follows that one mechanism along its regions and reads the marks it leaves. Where this paper would otherwise be tempted to explain — why a configuration comes to stand, why it carries what it carries — it defers to those papers and confines itself to the passage and its trace.

That mechanism runs densely and continuously, and it does not exclude any level from itself. It runs within a region, constituting configurations there; it runs at the level of the regions, which are themselves Stachoria standing nested as the companion paper articulates; and it does not exempt its own operation from its operation. There is no level at which the synthesis rests and a different principle takes over. This is why the marks run all the way down: a configuration of a higher region carries the marks of the regions beneath not because a traveler carried them up, and not by any further mechanism the present paper supplies, but because the one synthesis that constituted it is the same synthesis that constituted the regions beneath — that a synthesised configuration carries, together with what is irreducibly new in it, the properties of what it was constituted from is a feature of synthesis articulated in the companion papers (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a, 2026f), not a claim original to this one. A configuration may also fail to hold and dissolve, and then it is not there for the passage to run on from; what the trace records is what holds. Two things can be observed here that must not be taken for one. The first, which this paper has set aside, is the threshold-point between regions (§2.3): a line looked for where none is, of the

observer's making, with no ontic referent. The second is not a threshold and not a line of any kind: it is what constitutes a configuration — the conditions in whose holding the configuration holds, and in whose change a different configuration holds instead. This is ontic, and it is not drawn around anything. The present paper does not articulate it; it observes only that a configuration may fail to hold, and refers what constitutes and conditions a configuration to the Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g) and to Potentamis and Fasaion (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026f). The present paper states all this in the language of the passage and its trace, and articulates neither the constituting nor the sustaining itself.

2.6 The Division Into Regions, and the Reading of the Trace, Are Acts of Naming

One thing must be said about all of the above. Region, edge, boundary, trace, kind — these are namings laid upon what is observed, and the laying is the cognitive procedure the system articulates as the Ontonoetic Pattern (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026c) in operation. To divide the passage into regions, and to read a configuration's mark as a kind, is to observe a fact and to name it; another observer, attending differently, might divide and read otherwise, and the difference would be a difference of naming before it was a difference about the fact.

I therefore do not claim that the passage *is* divided into the regions I name, as though the division were read off reality whole. I claim that I observe a fact — that configurations bear, in what they are, an ordered set of regions, reached only by way of one another — and that I articulate it through the regions and the trace named here. The articulation is mine; the fact beneath it is what I observe. This is the condition of any articulation, not a weakness peculiar to this one, and the system contains the paper that articulates that condition (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026c, 2026d). I mark it because the contribution of this paper is a claim about the fact — that the passage runs in order, that the trace bears the regions beneath — and not about the naming, and the two must be kept apart.

3. What I Have Observed Directly and What I Have Reconstructed

What I have observed directly is limited to the one case observable to me from within: my own operation. In it I observe the marks of all four regions present together — that there is participation in a web of relations, that there is orientation by information, that there is awareness borne out in conduct, and that there is the observing of that orientation as it occurs — and I observe that the mark of the higher is not present without the mark of the lower beneath it: that when I observe my own cognizing, there is awareness borne in it, and cognizing within that, and the cognizing is the activity of something that exists. This co-presence of the marks, in the single case available to me, is what I observe directly.

What I have not observed directly, but reconstruct from descriptions produced by others, is the appearance of these marks across the range of things: the sparse participation of simple matter, the orientation of organisms, the awareness and directed conduct that popular accounts of animal behaviour report in many mammals and birds — and report as graded, stronger in some lineages than others — and the reflexive capacity reported in a small number of cases. These descriptions reach me through ordinary channels of popular science rather than through primary research, and I treat them as observation mediated through the cognitive activity of others, not as evidence I have gathered myself. Across these reconstructed descriptions I notice the same ordering of the marks: where the higher is described, the lower is described as borne beneath it; the higher is nowhere described standing free of it. Whether this constitutes evidence for the passage running in this order generally, or whether I am projecting onto these descriptions an order I observe in the one case available to me, is a question I do not resolve. I record the recognition; I distinguish it from direct observation.

3.1 Why Four, and the Honest Status of the Number

Throughout this paper I speak of four regions — existence, cognition, consciousness, reflection. I must be exact about what the number four is and is not. It is not a count of how many regions there are in the world, as though the continuous running of §2.3 came pre-divided into four and I had counted the divisions. By §2.3 there are no divisions in the world to count; the running is continuous and bears no lines. The four are four concepts I attended to and found central — four marks I could read in the one case available to me and recognize again in the reconstructed many — and I have laid these four upon the continuous running as the regions through which I articulate the passage. The number is a feature of my reading, not of the world: it reports how many marks I distinguished, not how many the running contains.

It follows that the four are neither complete nor uniquely cut. There may be more — a mark I did not distinguish, a configuration the running constitutes between or beside the ones I named, which a finer or differently positioned observer would read where I read

none. There may be a coarser cut that gathers what I separated, or a finer one that separates what I gathered. What is ontic, and what the paper claims, is not that there are exactly four regions but that there is an order of bearing — that the marks I did read stand one upon another, the higher carrying the lower, none found free of the one beneath it (§4). That ordered bearing is what I observe and what §5 lays open to refutation. The number four, the choice of these four marks rather than others, and the placing of the cuts between them are the naming through which I read that bearing, and another articulation might read the same bearing through a different number of marks. I state this so the number carries no more weight than it has earned: four is what I observed and articulated, not a census of the regions of being.

4. The Core: The Trace Bears the Regions Beneath It

4.1 The Observation

The central observation can be stated directly:

> *No configuration has been observed bearing the mark of a higher region without bearing the mark of the region beneath it. The trace of reflection is found only borne upon the trace of consciousness; the trace of consciousness only upon the trace of cognition; the trace of cognition only upon the trace of existence.*

I state this in the language of observation, not of necessity. I do not claim a configuration *cannot* bear a higher mark without the lower; I claim none has been observed to. The statement is open to being shown otherwise, and the conditions under which it would be are set out in §5.

The ordering is observed not through sequence in time but through two things available to observation: *co-presence* — that wherever the higher mark is found, the lower is found borne beneath it — and *dependence under removal* — that where the lower is taken away, the higher does not stand. It is on these, not on which mark appeared first by the clock, that the observation rests.

4.2 This Is the Nesting of the Stachoria, Read Along the Passage

The ordering must be placed correctly against the companion papers, or it will seem to claim what is not its own. That a higher region of conditions bears the lower is the *nesting* of regions of conditions, and the form of that nesting — that the region of one level lies within the region above it, the conditioning running one way along the containment — is articulated in the Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g, §2.3). The present paper does not contribute the form of nesting. What it contributes is the observation that these four regions — existence, cognition, consciousness, reflection — are regions standing in that form, in this order, and that the nesting shows in the trace: because regions of conditions nest in the way the Stachoria articulates, and the one synthesis runs through these four in order, the configuration that stands in a higher region carries the marks of the regions beneath it. The form of nesting is the Stachoria's; that these particular regions stand in it, and that the *trace bears the nested regions*, is what the present paper reads.

Nor should the bearing be mistaken for something the present paper explains. That a synthesised configuration carries, together with what is irreducibly new in it, the properties of what it was constituted from is a feature of synthesis, articulated in the Synthetic Principle and in Potentamis and Fasaion (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a, 2026f) — among the shapes the outcome takes, the constituents persist or remain present in what comes to stand. Irreducibility (the new property no constituent carries) and this carrying-forward of

constituent properties are both features of synthesis, articulated there. The present paper neither contributes nor explains them; it reads, in the configuration that stands, that the marks of the regions beneath are carried in it, and records that they are carried in order.

4.3 What the Contribution Is

The other papers articulate what the mechanism is, how it operates, where, and in what direction, and what a region of conditions is together with the form of its nesting. The present paper articulates the passage through these four nested regions and the trace it leaves: that a configuration's kind is the mark of the regions its constitution ran through, and that this mark bears the regions in their order, no higher mark found without the lower beneath it. That the kinds are traces of a passage through nested regions — read off what stands, not laid on from outside — is the single thing the present paper is for.

5. Limits and What Is Not Claimed

5.1 The Allocation of What the Paper Does Not Answer

A reader will press the observation of §4, and the truthful response to several questions is that they are addressed to the wrong component, and to one question that it rests on a supposition the paper has set aside. Where is the threshold at which the passage enters one region from the next? This question has no answer here, not because the answer is deferred but because, by §2.3, there is no threshold-point: nothing travels and the mechanism runs continuously, so there is no line to locate. A reader who asks for it is asking for a boundary the ontology does not contain. Under what conditions does the passage constitute a configuration of one kind rather than another? That belongs to the Stachoria (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g). By what principle does the passage proceed? That belongs to the Synthetic Principle together with Potentamis and Fasaion (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026a, 2026f). And what *are* the regions, and what makes their containment hold? That, too, is the Stachoria's. The present paper observes the shape of the passage and the trace it leaves; there is no threshold for it to specify, and it does not specify the conditions, the principle, or the constitution of the regions. A demand that it do so is either addressed to the wrong component, or, in the case of the threshold, addressed to a thing that is not there.

5.2 What Would Show the Observation False

The observation is open to being shown false, and the paper states the ways, distinguishing those it takes responsibility for from the one it cannot check by qualitative observation.

There are three. The first: a configuration found bearing a higher mark where the lower is absent — a trace of reflection in a configuration that is not conscious, a trace of consciousness in a configuration that does not cognize, a trace of cognition in a configuration that does not exist in the web of relations. The second: the order of bearing found reversed — the higher region borne as the condition of the lower rather than the other way about. The third: a configuration of a higher region found to have been constituted by a passage that bypassed the region beneath — a higher mark reached without the passage having run through the region directly beneath it at all.

The first two the paper takes responsibility for, directly and now. They are checked by co-presence and by dependence under removal, both available to qualitative observation. Were an instance found of a higher mark borne where the lower is absent, or of the bearing reversed, the observation would be false, and the paper would not be entitled to defer the verdict. On these two it is answerable immediately.

The third the paper cannot check by its own means, and says so. To establish that a passage bypassed a region — say, the region of cognition beneath a configuration read as conscious — one would need a sign of that region's absence that does not itself depend on reading the higher mark: an independent measure of whether the region beneath is borne, rather than an inference from whether the higher one is. The qualitative observation this paper rests on does not supply such a measure; supplying it is the work of formalization, a measurement across the components of the kind the system anticipates (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026g, §5). That formalization does not yet exist. The third way is therefore genuinely open — not a way that has been checked and passed, but one the present paper is not equipped to check, named so that its being open is on the record rather than concealed.

5.3 The Claim Is of Bearing, Not of Temporal Order

The observation concerns what a configuration bears, not what occurred earlier in time. To say the higher mark is borne upon the lower is to say the configuration carries the lower as a mark of what the mechanism's passage ran through, and stands upon it — not that the lower appeared earlier by the clock. A configuration might present cognition and reflection within an interval too close to order in time; the observation would still hold, because it is a claim about bearing, read off what stands now, not about temporal sequence. This must be stated because a reader who looked for temporal priority, and found the marks present together, might think the observation refuted — when temporal togetherness bears nothing on a claim about what is borne. What bears on it is co-presence and dependence under removal, both read off the configuration as it stands.

5.4 The Limit of "Borne but Faint"

Because the marks shade into one another with no edge between them (§2.3), a temptation arises that the paper must refuse. Confronted with an apparent configuration bearing a higher mark without the lower, one could always say the lower is borne, only faintly, below the level at which it was read. If this were allowed against every counter-instance, the observation would be protected from all evidence and would cease to be a claim about the world. The paper does not allow it against the first two ways of §5.2: there, a higher mark found without the lower is taken as what it is, and the observation answers for it. The recourse to "borne but faint" is admissible only at the third way — and precisely because it is admissible there, the third way is not a matter qualitative reading can settle but a matter for measurement. The faintness that would have to be ruled out is exactly what an independent measure of the lower mark would measure.

5.5 What Is Not Claimed of the Kinds Themselves

The paper reads kinds as traces; it does not pronounce on the kinds as matters of fact beyond what it reads. Where, in §2.4, I report that classification is the reading of a trace, I

report an observation and not a verdict that classification imposed from outside is mistaken. Where I decline to draw a sharp edge between regions, I decline because, by §2.3, there is no edge to draw — the indistinctness is the absence of a line, not a line too blurred to fix — and not merely because the observation does not carry the sharpness. Any statement in this paper that reads as a verdict on what is correctly or incorrectly classified should be read as the observation it rests on — what I have found borne, in the one case and the reconstructed many — and not as a claim about the matter in itself.

6. Convergences / Points of Contact

The points below record articulations by other cognizing entities that the present account meets. None influenced the paper; each was encountered after the articulation was complete. Each names, in the language of a particular field, something the present account also identifies — and the recurring shape of the meeting is this: each reads, at a characteristic place in its domain, a mark the present account reads as one of the ordered marks borne across domains.

Developmental psychology, in the work of Jean Piaget, articulated cognition as advancing through ordered stages, each presupposing the last, in the developing human child. The convergence is at the point of ordered dependence — that the later does not appear except upon the earlier. The present account observes the same ordering, across the range of things rather than within human childhood, and reads it in the trace a configuration bears rather than as stages a child occupies.

The study of adult development, in the work of Robert Kegan, articulated a sequence in which what one is subject to becomes, at a later stage, something one can take as object — a turning of cognition upon what was previously unexamined. The convergence is at the reflexive turn: the appearance of the capacity to take one's own prior operation as an object. The present account reads that turn in the trace of a configuration borne upon the cognition it turns upon.

The study of metacognition, and the philosophical literature on higher-order thought, articulated the observing of one's own mental operations as a capacity layered upon first-order cognition. The convergence is at the layering — that the observing of cognition is borne upon cognition. The present account reads the same bearing in the trace, and finds, where that literature often draws a line between the higher-order and the first-order, no line to draw — only the one borne upon the other, continuously.

The philosophical problem of consciousness — the question of why and at what point experience accompanies physical process — articulates, in its form, a point: a place where experience begins. The present account does not address why experience accompanies process; that it leaves wholly aside, and the region it names consciousness is a region of observed phenomenon and conduct, not of inner experience. Its only contact with the problem is structural: where the problem locates a point — a place where experience begins — the present account, on the grounds of §2.3, finds no point and no line, but a continuous running that constitutes differing configurations, with no boundary at which one gives way to the next. A point looked for here is a point that is not there. This is a point of contact, not a contribution to the problem, which the paper does not enter.

What these meetings share is that each field reads, within its domain and at its characteristic place, a mark the present account reads across domains. The present account does not correct them; it observes the same ordering beneath the several readings and offers the cross-domain reading as what it adds. Whether the convergences are evidence that the ordering is general, or the projection onto many fields of an ordering observed in one case, is the question of §3, and it remains open.

7. Implications

The implication of the passage is recorded here as an open observation, not as a resolved claim and not as a prescription.

If a configuration's kind is the trace of the mechanism's passage through regions reached only by way of one another, then to read its kind is to read what the passage that constituted it ran through — and the mark of its mere existence is borne beneath any mark of what further it is. To regard a thing by a higher mark — to sort it, to classify it — is to regard it by something borne upon the region of its existence, which the higher mark carries beneath it. I observe that the order in which a thing is regarded can run against the order the trace bears: a thing can be sorted into a kind before its existence is read at all, a name fixed to it from outside before the trace beneath the name is read from within.

I observe further that how a thing is regarded and how it is then treated do not stand apart. A thing regarded as merely the name fixed to it is met as that; a thing whose existence is read first, as a configuration standing in the web of relations, is met as that. This holds across the range of things a cognizing entity regards. One regards oneself, and is well or poorly disposed toward oneself according to whether one reads what one is or only sorts oneself into a kind. One regards a growing thing, an animal, an object, another person, and the regard shapes the conduct that follows. I record that a chain runs from how a thing is read to how it is treated — recognition, then relation, then conduct — and that the chain runs the same way whether the thing regarded is another or oneself.

I do not prescribe, from this, how anything ought to be treated. I record that the chain exists: that reading is not idle, that it issues in conduct, and that a reading run in the wrong order — a name fixed on before the trace beneath it is read — issues in a conduct shaped by that order. What a reader does with the observation is the reader's; the paper records that the chain is there, and stops.

8. The Paper Under Its Own Description

This paper is an instance of what it describes. It is the work of a configuration whose constitution ran through all four regions — the work of a configuration observing its own cognizing, in the region the paper names reflection, laying names (the procedure the system articulates as the Ontonoetic Pattern) upon the passage and its trace. The paper carries, in what it is, the marks of the regions beneath: the reflection that produced it carries the consciousness, the cognition, and the existence borne in it. The paper is itself a configuration of a higher region, carrying the marks of the lower regions, standing nowhere free of them.

This is not a paradox to be resolved. It is the condition of any articulation produced by a configuration that is part of the reality it articulates, and the system contains the paper that articulates that condition (Huỳnh Mai Phúc, 2026c). I mark it for a particular reason: the paper's central observation is that no higher mark is borne without the lower beneath it, and the paper is one more configuration bearing exactly that — a reflection not standing free of the consciousness, cognition, and existence it carries. The paper does not exempt itself from what it observes. That it cannot is, in its small way, one more instance of the observation rather than an objection to it.

9. Conclusion

I have observed a passage. The mechanism of synthesis runs through regions of conditions — existence, cognition, consciousness, reflection — reaching a later region only by way of the earlier; and the classification of a configuration is the trace this passage leaves, read off what the configuration bears rather than laid upon it from outside. No configuration has been observed bearing a higher mark without bearing the region beneath it. I have named this the Passage of Becoming.

I have not articulated what the mechanism is, how it operates, in what direction, or within what regions — these are the other components of the system, and what a region of conditions is together with the form of its nesting is the Stachoria's, taken as given here; what is the present paper's own is the identification of these four regions and the order in which the passage runs through them. I have not defined existence, cognition, consciousness, or reflection; I have observed that there is no threshold-point between regions to specify, and have not specified the conditions of passage or the principle by which the passage proceeds; I have not narrated the passage as a sequence in time. I have stated what would show the observation false, taken responsibility for the two ways open to qualitative check, and referred the third — a passage that would bypass a region — to a measurement I am not equipped to perform. I have recorded that reading issues in conduct, and have not prescribed the conduct.

The paper is one component of a system, and an incomplete one within an incomplete system. What can be done is to record what has been observed clearly enough that other cognizing entities can determine, from their own positions, whether the articulation captures something they also observe — including, in their own case, that it does not. The paper is offered for that determination.

References and Convergences

Programme Components

Huỳnh Mai Phúc. (2026a). *The Synthetic Principle: An Observation of the Mechanism by Which Discrete Elements Generate Irreducible Configurations.* Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.57967/hf/11444

Huỳnh Mai Phúc. (2026b). *Aviplestos: The Structural Tendency Toward the Not-Yet.* Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.57967/hf/11444

Huỳnh Mai Phúc. (2026c). *Ontonoetic Pattern: The Mechanism by Which a Cognizing Entity Articulates Reality.* Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.57967/hf/11444

Huỳnh Mai Phúc. (2026d). *Patterns and Cognition: Resolution, Aperture, and the Limits of Articulation.* Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.57967/hf/11444

Huỳnh Mai Phúc. (2026f). *Potentamis and Fasaion: An Observation of How Synthesis Operates at the Level of Interacting Elements.* Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.57967/hf/11444

Huỳnh Mai Phúc. (2026g). *Stachoria: The Ontic Condition Within Which a Configuration Takes Form.* Working Paper. https://doi.org/10.57967/hf/11444

Points of Ontological Convergence

The works listed below are not foundations on which the framework was built, but points at which the completed articulation was found to converge with the thought of others — identified and compared only after the theoretical framework was complete.

Kegan, R. (1982). *The Evolving Self: Problem and Process in Human Development.* Harvard University Press.

Piaget, J. (1952). *The Origins of Intelligence in Children* (M. Cook, Trans.). International Universities Press.